Turkey's "increased asset value"
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| Sinan Ulgen' s article | Our comments |
| With western influence in the Middle East faltering in the wake of America's misadventure in Iraq and Europe's general indecision, Sinan Ülgen argues that Turkish diplomatic successes in Syria and Iran and its growing stature throughout the Middle East have the potential to make it more attractive to the European Union | The geopolitical and other attractions of Turkey are not in doubt, but not as full member of the EU, but in close and cordial cooperation |
| Just a few years ago, Europe
headed Turkey's agenda. Recep Tayyip Erdogan's newly-elected
government had embarked on a series of ambitious reforms to meet
the EU's political criteria for joining the common area. At the
end of 2004 the EU decided in return to initiate accession talks
with Ankara. The ensuing pro-European euphoria was to be short lived, and for all practical purposes the accession negotiations have now reached deadlock. |
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| Turkey started EU membership talks
at the same time as Croatia, but while Croatia is now in the
final stages of the process, Turkey is struggling to proceed with
the negotiations. These difficulties have had a detrimental
impact on both Turkish politicians and on public opinion. Euro-scepticism is now at an all-time high in Turkey, and continues to be fuelled by the rhetoric of some European political leaders who voice their opposition to Turkey's accession. |
What has this to do with Croatia ? the two countries are incomparable with respect to the EU and therefore the procedures will be very different..The effects of delay are caused by the initial mistake and continued push for Turkey's bid. |
| The EU's own failure to dissipate doubts about the feasibility of Turkey's eventual membership is leading ever-larger constituencies in Turkey to lose faith in Europe and in the likelihood of accession. | There is no reason for Turkey to lose faith in Europe,the continent, but the loss of fait in accession to the EU as an organization is a healthy development in Turkey. |
| Domestic support for EU membership
had reached 70% at the start of the negotiations, but now that
figure is closer to 40 %. Not surprisingly, the Turkish government has also lost its appetite for EU-related reforms. For more than two years now, the European Commission has been hard pressed to find anything positive to say in its annual progress reports on political reform developments. In short, Turkey's European future is today as clouded as at any point in its contemporary history. Yet just as Europe is looking more distant, the Middle East is looming larger on Ankara's radar screen. |
If that is
true perhaps it is about time to stop the effort and save
Turkey's honor.. The reforms may be indeed "Europe related" but their real beneficiary was and is still Turkey. The frtuis of reform will remain availble evn if acession is not achieved. |
| Turkey is shifting its attention
from west to south, from Brussels to Beirut and beyond. The
question is whether this turnaround is a structural phenomenon -
a sign of a fundamental shift in Turkey's - or just a temporary
and transitional phase. Turkey has traditionally remained a bystander in Middle Eastern politics. |
This shift
is no problem for Europe. The links to Europe and to Turkey's
surroundings are not mutually exclusive. We very much welcome the greater Turkish interest in its own region. |
| It was thought the country had
little to contribute to or gain from getting involved in the
problems that beset Middle Eastern countries. The Ottoman legacy
was often used to justify this stance, with the argument being
that as long as the legacy endures Turkey will be viewed by its
Arab neighbours with suspicion. Developments in recent years have
seriously challenged this perception, with Turkey becoming a much
more active and visible player in the Middle East. Turkish diplomacy has scored a number of successes in the region. Ankara played an instrumental role in bringing about an end to the factional strife in Lebanon and its policy on Syria also produced tangible results. Turkish overtures to Syria, undertaken in spite of warnings from Washington, have paid off handsomely. Turkey was able not only to defuse the international tensions surrounding its Arab neighbour, but also to engineer the start of direct talks between Syria and Israel, a crucial contribution to the elusive Middle East peace process. |
That is fine and all to the credit of Turkey. We share those feelings and do not see any problem. |
| Ankara obtained this result by
investing in its relationship with Damascus and eventually
gaining the trust of the Assad regime. Turkey's strong relations
with Israel then enabled Ankara to bring the two rivals to the
table. On Iran, Turkish activism has been even more pronounced. In recent months, Turkey has multiplied its diplomatic efforts to help ease the nuclear stand-off between Iran and the west. Ankara went as far as hosting a visit from Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in August of last year. Turkey does not want to see a nuclear Iran, but that's chiefly because Turks are more afraid of the regional repercussions of such a development than of the threat it would pose to their own country. Turkey's growing activism in the Middle East is now being underpinned by a confluence of regional factors and geopolitical shifts. Turkey has been able to make headway in the turbulent waters of the Middle East because of the growing lack of U.S. legitimacy and lack of EU influence. In other words, as a rising regional power, Turkey has benefited from the handicaps of the global powers. The U.S. lost its ability to play a more constructive role in the Middle East following its ill-fated intervention in Iraq. |
We rejoice
in that. Beautiful ! Why so many words ? Since we have now some free space in this column let us mention an issue which the author to his credit wisely omitted - namely the NABUCCO gas pipeline which could supply Europe avoiding any transit through Russia. Some authors (for instance in the EuroParliament Président : Jacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI (PPE-DE, PL) think that Nabucco is a decisive or priority argument to admit Turkey in the EU. It is not. Europe can do many other things. If a gas pipeline should be a decisive factor in admitting Turkey, Europe indeed would be in a sorry state. But - I am sure of Turkey's normal business sense - "Nabucco" will be used even if Turkey is not a member of the EU. Any effort to use NABUCCO for blackmail will backfire. |
| With anti-American sentiments reaching new heights, the ability of many Arab governments to collaborate with the U.S. has been severely impaired. | |
| The Bush Administration's
neo-conservative agenda of bringing democracy to the Arab world
has also backfired. The U.S. first distanced itself from the more autocratic Arab leaders in a bid to support home-grown democratic alternatives, only to find that the only realistic political alternative to these regimes was to be found in the territory of political Islam. Given the lack of appetite in a U.S. administration conditioned by the "war on terror" for such an option, a return to the traditional policy of supporting the status quo was inevitable. |
Agreed |
| The EU has faced a different dilemma. Unlike the U.S., the EU's difficulty stems not from a perceived lack of legitimacy or crude attempts at promoting democracy, but a real lack of unity and, therefore, influence. The quest for a common denominator between the positions of different EU governments has hardly been conducive to the emergence of the sort of cogent and reliable diplomacy needed to address the deep problems of the Middle East. | Agreed |
| Individual EU countries continue
to maintain high national profiles in the region than the sum of
countries that the EU purports to be. In light of these serious deficiencies on the part of the main western powers, Turkey has been able to leverage both its regional ties and its standing in the transatlantic community to play a more instrumental role vis-à-vis its southern neighbours. |
We are sure that those European - we hope temporary - deficiencies were not exploited by Turkey against our European interests. On the contrary we welcome the Turkish newly active role. |
| And Turkey's potential for influence has been further enhanced by opportune demand and supply conditions. On the demand side, the main structural barrier that traditionally prevented Turkish involvement in the Middle East has been eroding. | No doubt. Where is the problem ? |
| Arab nationalists are fast becoming an endangered species, replaced by a rising political class more influenced by religion - a supranational ideology. As a result, the Ottoman legacy of a working state structure, tolerant of religion, was beginning to be viewed in a more favourable light. | We do not
see Arab nationalists as an endangered species needing
protection. The Ottoman legacy had some good points (though it did not have much tolerance of religion, and after the Ottoman times it became even worse!) |
| The Turkish model, whose
particularity for many Middle Eastern observers was its ability
to nurture a democracy-friendly political Islam, was suddenly in
demand. And too is Turkey. On the supply side, Turkey has been more prepared than ever to take advantage of these fundamental shifts. |
So be it ! |
| The ruling AKP party traces its roots to political Islam, and many of its leaders have their social networks in Islamic countries - in stark contrast to the secular style of Turkey's previous leaders, who had proudly displayed their western identity. | We have doubts on the AKP party, and accession would not take them away. |
| The result is that formal and
informal links between the new Turkish political élite and
the Arab world have been considerably easier. Decades-old trust and confidence deficits between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries are thus gradually being overcome. The frustrations of dealing with an undecided Europe have led Turkish policy-makers to focus their efforts on an area where the expected return on their investment was more immediate and more concrete. Prime Minister Erdogan has recently visited many countries in the Middle East - Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq - but has not been to Brussels since 2005. There can be no doubt that Ankara's growing activism in its foreign policy, especially in relation to the Middle East, has begun to enhance the role and influence of Turkey in its own region. |
No problem. All this is reason to rejoice. Europe has no interest to stop this. Why so many words ? |
| Turkey is now firmly set to become
a regional power, with its recent election to the UN Security
Council a further testimony to Ankara's diplomatic prowess The question is whether this shift of focus towards the south and towards Turkey's status as a regional power comes at the expense of the country's EU ambitions. |
All of this is very enjoyable and certainly Europe will pay great attention to Turkey as a regional great power. Finally Turkey has found its home. |
| With so much of the country's diplomatic and political energy now focused on regional issues, that seems to leave little room for advancing its EU membership ambitions. | Membership is for us not desirable. A strong cordial relationship, however, is for both of us, also for Turkey, essential. |
| It is no coincidence that Turkey's
failure to implement a long-term communications strategy with
Brussels comes in the face of ever-falling public support in EU
countries for enlargement of the common area to include
Turkey. For optimists, Turkey's growing regional influence is seen as a sure way of enhancing its asset value for the EU. The multi-faceted diplomacy of Ankara and the strengthening of Turkey's status as a soft power in the region are not necessarily at odds with its EU membership objective. On the contrary, it should facilitate Turkey's European bid. Yet this claim is predicated on the assumption that Europe has the capacity and the willingness to benefit from what Turkey has to offer. In other words, this strategy can only pay off if the EU is able to strengthen its own capacity for concerted action on foreign policy. |
What does
the author mean by "communications strategy with Brussels"? A
joint push by EU governments to force Turkey' bid on Europe's
nations? The "NO's" of past years in European countries will then
multiply ! Turkey's "asset value" …..as a thing to be sold ? The expression is less fortunate. Leave the question of European disunity a while to our side. We shall sort out that problem. Hasty decisions will not be welcomed. |
| So Turkish accession would not, as European federalists like to argue, lead to a weaker Europe. | "Voices-of-Europe" rejects federalism.. We think that accession of Turkey would weaken the European Union both by its impact on top decision making, and on cohesion in our cities and suburbs. |
| On the contrary, Turkey's membership would make Europe a more influential and capable world power. | The EU must never "buy size and power" at the cost of internal political and social cohesion. Geopolitical influence is built on inside strength, not on size. Europe's role will be better served if the EU and Turkey can in good cooperation live together without commingling their political structures |
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